Hi, everyone. Almost three years ago I published one post about my master’s thesis and now become published its main abstract in the journal of tabriz University
In discussing the concept of substance, Al-Fārābī seeks to create a unity between Plato and Aristotle’s views. It can be argued in another way that Al-Fārābī seeks to create a unity between the book of metaphysics and Aristotle’s treatise on categories, and it is in this direction that his innovative theory of substance is born. Aristotle, in his treatise on metaphysics, considers ousia or substance as the same external particular thing such as “this tree is here” (Aristotle, 1998: 207); Or in another place in the same book, he considers the agent of distinguishing a thing from another thing to the substance, that is, its form. However, in his treatise on categories, he considers the essential concepts that are imprinted on foreign things in mind (Ackrill 1975: 2) as Plato, but unlike Plato, aristotle believes the place of these concepts in mind (Ritter et al., 2014: 28); Al-Fārābī now states that it is both an external thing of substance and a concept derived from it; In the sense that external substance first exists, the external thing is a real substance, but in that the concepts derived from that thing are more stable and durable than an external thing, They take precedence over the substance. Among Al-Fārābī’s works, in ten treatises and books, substance and its derivatives have been discussed in a scattered manner. In this article, we have stated all these cases and analyzed them.
My Master’s Thesis is on the subject of substance but from farabi view. Till now, I understand that this philosopher is significantly Affected by Aristotle’s organon, special in this subject. I mean that Aristotle in his organon has trends to quiddity till being. He diagnosed two substances: primary Substance and Secondary substance. The substance of the first is the same external being, for example, “this human” or “this pen,” but the substance of the second is the conception of that external thing or is quiddity. But Aristotle, in the metaphysical back of his idea and says that substance is one, and it is an external thing
Now mister farabi is significantly trends to the first Aristotle idea. He divides existence into the section: Bing and quiddity. Then he divides quiddity into a section: substance and attribute. This was the abstract of my research till now
?Now the question is, Why does farabi put substance Of divisions of quiddity not being
.It is very problematic. Be wait till the Next results and say your idea, please. Thanks
by dr hamid khosravani